“A ras de suelo”: Candidate Appearances and Events in Mexico’s Presidential Campaign*

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Abstract

This work examines a crucial part of modern presidential campaigning in Mexico: candidate appearances in municipalities. It also traces the changes in presidential campaigning over the past 30 years and finds that modern campaigning does not just involve mass media appeals, but also “the ground war,” that is, candidate visits to cities and towns all across Mexico. To understand how parties in Mexico strategize the candidate appearance schedule, we have gathered a unique data-base that examines all the municipalities visited by each candidate to understand how campaign teams spend valuable resources.

Resumen

El trabajo describe una parte crucial de las campañas modernas presidenciales en México: las visitas de los candidatos a las localidades. Nosotras revisamos la historia de las campañas presidenciales y describimos cómo la competencia electoral y las reformas electorales las han cambiado en los últimos años. Finalmente, utilizando una base de datos novedosa de todas las visitas de los tres candidatos durante toda la campaña de seis meses hemos podido entender las diferentes estrategias de eventos que usan los candidatos presidenciales de los tres partidos.
Introduction

During the six-month long presidential campaign, the airwaves of Mexican television were filled with 30 second spots extolling the personal image of each candidate and his promises for the next sexenio; meanwhile, the candidates themselves were busily travelling from town to town in search of votes. In an iconic image of the 2006 presidential race, the PRD’s candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador was photographed giving a speech in a small town as he faced the plaza filled with local residents, arms held out, with an ancient church in the foreground, a silent witness to the candidate’s appeal to the crowd. But López Obrador was not the only presidential hopeful who went on a pilgrimage through the towns, cities, and state capitals of the nation; all three major candidates were on the road campaigning for most of the six-month race, giving speeches, meeting with the local party base, lunching with businessmen, receiving blessings from religious leaders, and giving interviews to local television and newspaper reporters.

Presidential campaigns in Mexico have changed dramatically in the last 15 years as the nation democratized, yet much research remains to be done to understand the nature of modern campaigning in a competitive environment. One might think from several scholarly works and media reports that the new campaigns in Mexico are made up of only coordinated media appeals —paid advertising spots on radio and television. However, the base of the traditional campaigns —candidate appearances at events in municipalities— have continued to play an important role in the modern campaign strategies of all three parties. Important work has been done on effects of media appeals on voting outcomes (Beltrán 2006; Domínguez and Lawson 2005; Lawson 2002), but there is almost no research on how the presidential campaign teams strategize their six-month long “ground-war,” that is, the candidate appearance schedule. This chapter will help fill this gap in our scholarly knowledge by examining why presidential candidates travel to some of the nation’s nearly 2,500 municipalities, and not to others. It will help show that, though all parties bear some common campaign strategies, they also differ in systematic and interesting ways. Because the three parties spend millions of pesos and a great deal of time on these travelling candidate tours, one must understand them to draw a more complete picture of campaigning in general. This chapter uses a unique data base of all of the three major parties’ candidate appearances at the municipal level in the Mexican presidential election of 2006 to test some theories of how candidates choose to campaign

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1 *Municipios* are roughly the equivalent of towns or counties in the US.
2 Campaign events are usually defined as candidate appearances, debates, and advertising (Herr 2002). This chapter deals exclusively with candidate appearances, which is often called the “whistle-stop” tour or the ground war.
“on the ground”. This data is taken from a national newspaper, El Universal, and includes all appearances by the candidates of the PAN, PRD, and PRI over the course of the entire campaign, which ran from late-January 2006 to late-June 2006. The following section discusses the literature on campaigns and uses these studies to develop several testable hypotheses about how we might expect Mexican presidential candidates to strategize their campaign appearances. The third section presents a brief history of Mexican presidential campaigning. The fourth section describes the data used to evaluate Mexican candidates’ campaign strategies, presents a series of statistical tests used to evaluate the hypotheses, and discusses the results. The chapter ends by drawing some conclusions about presidential campaigns and what they can tell us about how parties court voters in Mexico’s new democracy.

2. Campaigning, Candidate Appearances, and Theoretical Expectations about Mexican Presidential Campaign Events

Casey (2001, 5-6) notes that campaigns are a series of activities that candidates (and their teams or party leaders) undertake to win votes on Election Day. These activities include strategizing over what the candidate will emphasize in his media message; distributing resources to the different parts of the campaign, and monitoring the rivals’ activities, while planning a media approach and keeping abreast of the way the public responds to these appeals. The goal of campaigns is to inform rationally ignorant voters about the candidates, the parties, and their likely actions once in office and persuade citizens to opt for a particular candidate or party. Campaigns can activate and reinforce voters’ prior predispositions on parties and issues and they can increase voters’ knowledge of candidates’ issue stances (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994). As a result, canvassing efforts can influence voting behaviour, and so, they can influence the outcome of a race, especially a closely-fought one (Simon, 2002).

There is a lively debate in political science over the effects on voting behaviour of campaigning, and many argue that a media-based strategy is a more effective method of persuading and mobilizing potential voters than candidate appearances. The paid television spots reach far more people than rallies and meetings, so if elections are won by garnering millions of votes, then clearly television and radio are likely to be more effective in reaching the masses. Candidate appearances, on the other hand, can only reach

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3 Calderón Alzati and Cazés (1996, 125) created a similar data-base for the 1994 presidential elections in which they did a day by day study of the three parties’ campaign activities. Their data shows that Zedillo held 410 events, Cárdenas, 562, and Fernández de Cevallos, 234. The PRI held more meetings in the DF, Estado de México, Jalisco, Baja California, Veracruz, Nuevo León, and Sinaloa. We do not know if the authors looked at the actual municipalities the candidates visited.

4 For more on this debate, see Bartels (1993); Gelman and King (1993); Shaw (1999), Shaw and Roberts (2000).
thousands or even hundreds of people at a time, and so are thought to be far weaker vehicles for persuading and mobilizing voters. Despite the debate in the scholarly literature, candidates for in Mexico (and in most presidential democracies) stubbornly continue to tour the nation, visiting hundreds of municipalities during the six-month campaign.

What benefits, then, do candidate appearances hold? First and perhaps foremost, a rally in a town can mobilize the party’s strong identifiers, that is, it can convince those who are already partisan identifiers to actually vote on Election Day. Some argue that a candidate appearance can move the vote more than a radio or television advertisement (King and Morehouse, n.d.; Shea and Burton, 2001). A small meeting with the candidate can energize the party activist base in the locality, which can be important for voter mobilization and fund-raising (Herr, 2002). Successful whistle-stops can generate interest in the candidate by creating the image that the candidate is close to the voter and is concerned with his problems (King and Morehouse, n.d.). And finally, free local media exposure (mostly positive and uncontested by rival campaign teams) can offset the small audiences at rallies (Holbrook, 2002).

The relevant literature in political science has by and large ignored the question of how presidential campaign teams strategize their candidate appearance tours (or the ground war, as it has been called), which gives us a unique opportunity to use Mexico as a test case to examine broader questions about campaigning in presidential democracies. This chapter will develop and test different models that are derived from the campaign effects literature to understand the ground campaign more fully.

One can view candidates as strategic actors who must operate under a series of constraints when strategizing how to distribute resources (such as a candidate’s time and money) in a campaign (Carsey, 2000; Shaw, 1999). These constraints include: the nation’s electoral rules, the number and geographic distribution of partisan supporters, and the amount of campaign financing available from different sources. Parties and candidates attempt to segment the overall voting population into smaller groups with distinct socio-economic or partisan characteristics and then target certain segments that could vote for the candidate. Different parties, while operating under the same electoral rules, usually face different distributions of partisan strength, and may use candidate appearances in different ways. So, given the specific limitations

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5 Holbrook and McClurg (2005) mark clearly the difference between mobilization, which is simply activating those with a partisan bias in favor of the candidate to come out and vote on Election Day, and persuasion, which means convincing the voter to support the candidate in question.

6 Shea and Burton (2001, 185) argue that direct voter contact works can be an effective way of both persuading and mobilizing voters: for example, seeing a candidate at a rally “brings that voter to a different cognitive level than other methods of communicating message”, allows two way communication between the candidate and the voter, helps citizens remember election and candidate, and humanizes the candidate.

7 Eldersveld and Walton argue that local party leaders can be crucial in national and presidential campaigns by taking care of voter registration, fund raising, get out the vote drives (2000, 150). See also Beck (1994).
found in the Mexican case, what expectations can one draw about appearance strategizing? This section forms different models of candidate behavior that can explain different appearance strategies.

Model One: The Electoral System. Mexico’s presidential election is decided in a single national district, in a single-round plurality election. Candidate appearances take place in municipalities (villages, towns, and cities) —that is, candidates do not arrive in states and give speeches at the state level; rather, they go to towns and neighbourhoods to ply for votes.\(^8\) Because the size of the nation’s municipalities varies dramatically from roughly 100 residents to 3 million, one should see candidates visiting only the largest municipios, which hold the largest number of potential voters.\(^9\)

Model Two: Partisan Bastions. Many argue that core supporters are more likely to be convinced by and respond to campaign information than undecided voters or swing voters, so campaigns should focus on mobilizing their supporters (Campbell et al., 1960; Holbrook and McClurg, 2005, 689). Independents are less informed, less likely to vote and need to be both persuaded by the candidate and mobilized (Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; Shaw, 1999). Therefore, one should expect to see the candidates visit those municipalities in which partisan support is highest, independent of the size of the municipio. However, because of the enormous differences in municipality sizes, it is possible that there might be an interaction effect between partisan density and population of the municipality; therefore, a modified expectation from the partisan support model would be that candidates should visit large municipalities that hold a great number of partisan supporters (Holbrook, 2002).

A third variant of the partisan supporter model is that candidates would visit almost all municipalities in states governed by a co-partisan (Powell, 2004). Directly elected state executives hold many resources and are able to support and aid presidential elections through fund-raising, taking out advertising, and activating the party base in the state. Furthermore, it is in the interests of the governors to support congressional campaigns (which are concurrent with the presidential election in Mexico), that are often tied to the strength of the presidential candidate. Therefore, one might find that campaign teams send the candidate to blanket municipalities in those states in which a governor from the same party is in office.

The Swing Voter Model. Instead of aiming one’s resources at partisan strong-holds, one might find that campaign teams aim for the swing voters. As some authors argue, undecided voters often make the difference in

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\(^8\) The Americanist literature uses states as the unit of analysis because of the electoral college rule.

\(^9\) When a close aid of the López Obrador was asked about the campaign schedule, he stated that the candidate, unlike his predecessor in the last presidential elections, had only gone to the largest municipalities to campaign, and had refused invitations from local party leaders in smaller municipalities because he was aiming for numbers and not partisan support in his campaign appearances. Interview with Manuel Camacho Solís, March 2007, Mexico City.
presidential campaigns (Shea and Burton, 2001, 77). In Mexico, one sees great fluctuations in partisan identification as the hegemonic party system is replaced due to democratization. Moreno (2003) finds that non-identifiers make up over 30% of the voting population in Mexico, more than any other single group of party identifiers. Many young people in Mexico have never held a strong identification to any party (Magaloni, 2004); others have changed theirs as new electoral options come to fore (Domínguez and McCann, 1996), which could mean that Mexican voters are more likely to change their party choice over elections. This gives parties incentives to chase volatile voters. Therefore, one might expect to see candidates visiting more municipalities where voting has been volatile in the recent past. Again, an interaction effect between population and volatility would be expected.

The PRD, for example, has historically been weak in the north, taking as a guide the very low numbers in recent gubernatorial elections or recent congressional elections (Klesner, 2004). However, a candidate in a single national district cannot afford to ignore an entire region. A charismatic presidential hopeful can gain hundreds of thousands of new voters in states in which his party had never done well, especially in the context of high voter volatility. There may be some strategy of candidate appearances in weak partisan regions in an attempt to win new voters for the presidential candidate.

3. A Short History of Presidential Campaigning in Mexico

Lázaro Cárdenas, president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940, began the tradition of PRI campaigning that would survive until roughly the 1994 elections. In the second half of 1933 and into 1934, General Cárdenas spent almost 12 months canvassing the nation, visiting hundreds of municipalities, ranches and tiny villages (those that are too small to be designated municipios, but rather poblados o ranchos). The PNR (the grandfather of the once-hegemonic PRI) in the years before Cárdenas had not been able to branch out and create a centralized party structure, and had to depend on local strong-men to maintain political order (Garrido, 1982). Few Mexicans in the years before television or radio (and in a nation that was largely illiterate) had ever seen a president or heard appeals from those who were running for high political office. Cárdenas undertook his months-long tour of the nation for several reasons: to connect and make deals with local strongmen and military officers, to allow the common citizen who was still rural and impoverished to hear the promises of the central government, and to uncover the problems and opportunities of the nation’s many regions (Cárdenas, 1972). The tour was wildly popular, as hundreds of thousands of villagers and townspeople were present at rallies that made up the earliest whistle-stop tour in Mexican campaigning history.
After this campaign of 1934, all PRI president candidates, even though they knew there was almost no possibility of losing the election, conducted their own version of the national tour, and spent months visiting all areas of the nation. As television and radio began to reach almost all corners, reporters joined the PRI candidate in his travels and chronicled the rapturous reception the president would receive (after a quick painting and clean up of the streets in which he would pass). The PRI’s dominance over the political and electoral arenas meant that opposition parties had few chances to win any election at almost any level of government, and furthermore, that they were resource poor.

When television became prominent in the 1960s and into the 1970s, the hegemonic party was able to create a comfortable relation with the private owner of the new television monopoly (Televisa) and assure that first, the PRI candidate received only positive coverage; and second, the opposition party candidates were largely ignored (Lawson, 2002; Magar and Molinar, 1995). Several studies have been conducted to estimate the biased TV coverage of this period. Hughes (2006, 162) brings several works together that estimate the coverage of the privately owned television monopoly and finds that in the 1982 presidential election, the opposition received slightly more than 30% of the vote, and just over 10% of TV time; while in 1988, the opposition share of the votes shot up to 50%, but the outsider parties received under 10% of TV coverage. Because the opposition candidates had so little money and because the television monopoly would not accept their paid advertising, they were largely shut out of the mass media (Magar and Molinar, 1995).

This biased coverage in favour of the PRI was not as pervasive in newspaper reporting, but still, enormous differences were noted in the number of stories on the PRI and their positive tone, especially from newspapers closely tied to the official regime, such as *Excelsior* and *El Universal* (Hughes, 2006; Lawson, 2002). A major Mexico City daily in 1988 gave about 46% of its space to the PRI, versus 12.5% to the PAN and 11.4% to the left candidate, while covering the two far smaller opposition parties far better at 21%! (Trejo Delarbre, 1988).

It is important to note that media coverage under the PRI (until 1994) consisted largely of two types of strategies: first, the government’s paid advertisements (that were not campaign spots) extolling its achievements in office (hospital openings, new highways, etc.), and second, the nightly news stories that only dealt with the PRI presidential candidate. The PRI did not have a specific media strategy of paid television and radio advertising spots. The presidential campaign was based, even into the late 1980s as the PRI began to lose its overwhelming majority, on candidate appearances: rallies with assembled villagers, meetings with local leaders and businessmen, and interviews with local and national media. The candidate appearance based campaign began to change in a fundamental way in the years just before the
PRI first lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 or the Presidency in 2000.

Two shocks helped modernize the Mexican presidential campaign. The first was the growing electoral popularity of opposition parties (Magaloni, 2006) and the second, large scale electoral reform. The electoral reform of 1996 changed public campaign finance laws so that all parties could compete almost equally in campaigns, especially on the expensive media side. Furthermore, the newly autonomous electoral agency, the Federal Electoral Institute (or IFE), was now charged with monitoring both the news programs and the number of advertising spots for each presidential team and publishing these results. The television bias had begun to change by 1994, when the opposition parties share of TV time had risen to over 35%, and by 2000, there was roughly proportional coverage to share of votes (Hughes, 2006).

Campaign modernization takes many forms; for example, voters are targeted with far greater precision, specific strategies of persuasion are followed to delineate voters and shape a message for that specific group; and marketing experts are brought on board to fashion television spots. Professional consultants now form part of the campaign team: they measure public opinion, determine the geographical map of strong supporters and independent voters; they shape the candidate’s image, they react to rival television spots, raise funds, and shape the overall message of the campaign (Shea and Burton, 2001; Wattenberg, 1982). These changes imply that the parties must hire specialists that are not necessarily members of the party organization; that campaigns are more expensive as the parties move into media advertising; and that presidential candidates—not the party—will usually be in charge of running the campaign (Beltrán, 2006).

Beltrán (2006) describes a new sort of Mexican presidential campaign that took place in 2000: television dominated, candidate image was considered more important than the actual issues, the campaign was followed in the media, and the news coverage of the three parties’ candidates was basically unbiased. Of the 130.4 million dollars that were spent on political communication, 56% was spent on television advertising to air 330 political ads, 36% on radio, and 8% on printed matter (Beltrán, 2006).

However, during the radical shift in campaign style over the past ten years in Mexico, the parties did not simply stop the ground war. In the 2006 data set, we find that out of approximately 162 campaigning days, at least one of

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10 For a fuller account of the electoral reform of 1996, see Becerra, Salazar, and Woldenberg (1997).
11 Jennifer Smith (2004, 2) describes a modern campaign as “one that's carried out on television, guided by market research, designed with tools of commercial advertising, technological innovation to reach voters, planned by specialist professionals, has displaced, or reduced importance of, a more traditional form of campaigning that had relied on personal contact, longstanding partisan loyalties, and extensive use of volunteers.”
12 Eldersveld and Walton (2000, 222) note that the campaign team first identifies groups of potential voters through opinion polling. Then, it develops a coherent message using media consultants, finds an adequate technology to send out that message, and opinion pollsters to evaluate whether the campaign and candidate are performing well with the different segments of the electorate.
the candidates was making a campaign appearance on 150 of those days, most of them outside the Federal District. In total, more than 950 separate events were held by the three candidates in more than 350 of the nation’s municipalities. At this point, it is impossible even to guess at the amount of money spent on media versus the ground war, but it is clear that both mass media and appearances form the base of the modern Mexican presidential campaign. This paper does not argue that campaign events necessarily influenced the voters or changed the direction of the race; rather, it asks how the campaign teams strategize their candidate appearance schedules.

What do the three major parties believe they gain by sending the candidate out on the several appearance tours (called giras, or turnabouts) to give speeches and meet with local leaders? The PRI used to hold rallies and small meetings with local leaders in their campaign strategy during the hegemonic era for several reasons: to tie the local party base to the national party via clientelist exchange, to uncover the problems of the localities, and to test the mobilizational ability of the candidate in a trial run for election day (Langston and Morgenstern, n.d.). If the party base in the locality were successful at the “acarreo de gente” that is, getting people to fill the town’s plaza, then it was thought they would be successful at herding them to the voting booths as well. The problem for the hegemonic PRI was not so much to defeat the other parties as much as to get millions of voters to participate in rigged elections.

This imperative has clearly changed since the rise of electoral competition, and now parties must persuade and mobilize voters in far more competitive races. The members of the candidates’ teams themselves say that the candidate ground war can energize the party base so they will be more likely to volunteer in fundraising and in poll watching, and it can also mobilize the partisan supporters so they will come out on Election Day. Small meetings with local leaders (which we include as part of the overall ground war), especially with businessmen, are crucial for fund-raising.13

One should note that these two bases of modern Mexican campaigning are not separate: they are inter-related in that one can affect the other. The most interactive effect is of course that the candidate appearances are covered extensively by both electronic and printed media in national and local markets. Therefore, when a candidate does well in a series of events, filling the plazas, speaking well (without being interrupted by cat-calls), this will be reported and shown on the nightly news programs, multiplying the effect of a small rally. When Felipe Calderón was doing poorly in the polls at the beginning of the campaign season, he tended to go to PAN bastion municipalities so he could be shown (and written about in the Mexico City dailies) as surrounded by hundreds of cheering panistas and generate some

momentum. On the other hand, when Roberto Madrazo spoke at a student rally in Hidalgo at the very beginning of campaign in January and the students booed him, this too was reported and helped strengthen the idea that Madrazo was unpopular, even with his partisan base. López Obrador caused an enormous and positive sensation when, at local rallies, he first compared Madrazo and Calderón to a squawking bird (chachalaca) and then used this term to tell the president of Mexico, Vincente Fox, to stay out of the campaign. However, when the national media began to show him with holding up the birds and making fun of the president of the nation, he looked unfit for the presidency. The chachalaca incidents were among the most damaging in his race.

3.1. Differences among Parties
This section will provide a short history of campaigning and party organization for each of Mexico’s three main rivals to help understand why they might follow different candidate appearance strategies. The former hegemonic party was based on two pillars: the sectoral organization and the geographic party affiliates based in municipalities and states. The PRI was (and perhaps still is) the largest party structure with by far the greatest extension of its local branches. Candidate appearances (for the presidential race) used to be organized by local leaders, especially the governors, the mayors (almost all of whom were members of the PRI), and the corporatist sectors. Since the onset of democracy and electoral competition, the PRI continues to be strong in many areas of the nation. There have been battles within the PRI over the best way to approach campaigning in the competitive era, with some leaders of the “territorial base” of the party arguing that spending on rallies and clientelist exchange are better forms of meeting the opposition challenge than simply relying on TV spots. Those party leaders who are not tied to the party’s base are far less convinced by these “old-fashioned” methods, and believe strongly that most of the money that is spent on “energizing the party base” is in fact stolen by these more traditional party leaders and does little to win votes on Election Day. Much of the wrangling over how to meet the new challenges of electoral competition stems from which sector of the party would benefit from the selective distribution of resources.

In the PRD, the campaign style during the 1990s and into the new century was based on the galvanizing effect of the 1988 elections, in which the unified left candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (a former member of the PRI who left the party shortly before the campaign), who was largely shut out of mass media coverage (see above), challenged the hegemonic party in the presidential race, and almost won. Cárdenas, son of the former president who

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14 Interview with Dulce María Sauri, president of the party during the 2000 elections, September, 2003. Interview with the former Secretary of Elections of the CEN of the PRI, Hector Hugo Olivares, February, 2000.
had begun the national tour, spent his campaign touring the nation, travelling from town to town, holding small rallies. Word of mouth about the son of “Tata Cárdenas” (Grandfather Cárdenas) spread slowly, and by the end of the campaign season, Cuauhtémoc was holding larger rallies. After the supposed “system shut-down” (caída del sistema) and subsequent electoral fraud, the demonstrations against the PRI and in favour of Cárdenas grew to historic numbers. With little money, almost no media coverage, and in the face of opinion polls that dramatically under-reported the left candidate’s popularity; the Cárdenas campaign almost defeated the PRI.

This campaign would mark the future presidential canvassing efforts of the newly formed center-left PRD for the next two presidential elections (1994 and 2000) as Cárdenas refused to change his campaign style, even when public money for more media based appeals became available (Aguilar Zinser, 1995 and Bruhn, 2000). Cárdenas believed that if he “filled the plaza” then his campaign was performing well, no matter what the (untrustworthy) opinion surveys might say. Strangely enough, the new party did not modernize its campaign style as did the hegemonic PRI. This was a serious problem given that the PRD was a regionally based party that was strong only in the metropolitan area and a few other states, such as Michoacán, Guerrero, parts of the State of Mexico and Veracruz (see Klesner, 2004 for more on the regional strengths of the different parties).

Despite the failings of Cárdenas’ three presidential campaigns, López Obrador announced in late 2005 that his campaign would be “a ras de suelo”, meaning a ground-based event tour that would not put so much emphasis on media advertising.15 He said this type of campaign style would bring him close to the people and that they would not fail him, no matter what kinds of attacks his rivals might use. And in fact, when the Calderón campaign began a series of advertising spots that attacked the PRD candidate’s credibility, López Obrador did not respond with a counter-spot for almost a month, preferring to defend himself in his speeches given in the rallies.16

The center-left PAN, an opposition party that was formed in 1939 in opposition to the authoritarian, mass-based, and left leaning Party of the Mexican Revolution (the PRM, another of the PRI’s predecessor parties) had survived several long decades out of power, with a strong ideological stance that was politically and economically liberal, and tied to the Catholic Church (Middlebrook, 2001; Mizrahi, 2003). The PAN had traditionally been the second most important party in Mexico, and the main challenger to the hegemonic PRI; however, when Cárdenas came close to defeating the PRI’s

15 “AMLO justifica ausencia en debate.” Jorge Ramos. El Universal. Abril 25, 2006. It is important to note that López Obrador ended up spending more than the other two candidates on advertising appeals. At least, it has been reported that he bought more seconds that the PRI or the PAN teams. See ife.org.mx for more on the monitoring of the advertising spots.
presidential candidate in 1988, the party fell to third place in the presidential vote. The center-right party was perhaps the best able to modernize its campaign strategies because it had no strong leaders defending the ground war, and it did not have a foundational moment that was based on this same style of campaigning. Therefore, in 1994, the PAN forwarded a charismatic presidential candidate who was able to handily defeat both the PRI’s and the PRD’s rivals in the first-ever televised debate in Mexican history. A TV star was born, and the campaign’s popular appeal rose dramatically. With this short-lived victory\(^\text{17}\) came recognition of the power of mass media. While the PAN did have party organizational strength in some regions of the nation,\(^\text{18}\) it could not depend on mobilization capacity in many areas. If it hoped to win a presidential election, the PAN had to reach voters who had never voted for it before.\(^\text{19}\)

Calderón never questioned the importance of mass media appeals: the party professionalized dramatically during the 1990s and has hired outside expert consultants to help modernize campaigning. However, if one sees the PAN as the party most likely to adopt the “Americanized” campaign style, Calderón still conducted tours of the nation’s towns and cities, held rallies, and made stump speeches. The difference is perhaps that when Calderón was trailing in the polls through February, he reworked his media strategy and created advertising spots to question and attack the left leaning candidate; calling him a danger for Mexico and comparing him to Venezuela’s populist president Hugo Chávez. When the PRD candidate chose not to attend the first debate in late April, Calderón took advantage of his absence and dominated the event, looking confident and relaxed. After the debate “victory”, the candidate rose in the polls and was able to hold much larger rallies,\(^\text{20}\) which was reported on in the nightly news, creating a virtuous cycle.

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\(^{17}\) After the debate victory, the candidate’s (Diego Fernández de Cevallos) popularity with voters grew dramatically. However, he then dropped out of the news, and his numbers slid. It has never been clear why his campaign stopped campaigning.

\(^{18}\) Lujambio (2001) argues that the PAN had built up an “electoral organization” even before the 1982 bank nationalization, and so was able to take better advantage of the outrage against the economic crisis of the early 1980s.

\(^{19}\) Magaloni and Moreno (2004) found that the PAN had won votes from all regions and socio-economic groups in the 2000 elections.

4. Statistical Analysis of Campaigning in Mexico

4.1. The Variables and Data
There are three dependent variables under study here: the municipalities visited by Calderón, López Obrador, and Madrazo during the 2006 presidential campaign. Mexico is divided into nearly 2,500 municipalities, so it is unlikely that even during a lengthy six-month campaign that any candidate could visit all of them. For each candidate, this variable is coded as 1 if the candidate visited the municipality sometime during the campaign, regardless of how many times he may have gone there, and 0 if he did not. The three candidate-specific variables were created based on analysis of one of Mexico’s premier national newspapers, *El Universal*. Nearly each day during the campaign, reporters accompanying the three candidates wrote articles detailing the candidates’ campaign travels and events. Daily analysis of campaign reporting resulted in a total of 957 total campaign events during the six month campaign that ranged from mass rallies and party-specific events to meetings with specific interest groups and local press conferences. We were able to identify the precise municipality for 914 out of 957 events. Those events whose location remained unspecified were spread about evenly among the three candidates, so we assume that they are randomly distributed and introduce no bias into the dataset. The 914 remaining events took place in a total of 359 municipalities throughout the nation. Of these, Calderón visited 135 municipalities, López Obrador 229, and Madrazo 143.

The principal independent variables of concern include: the total number of votes at stake in the municipality, the percent share of prior municipal support for the candidate, and whether the municipality lies in a state controlled by the candidate’s party or an opposition party. Data for the total number of votes at stake in the municipality is taken from Mexico’s most recent federal elections, the 2003 lower chamber elections. The percent share support for the candidate in the municipality is also taken from the 2003 lower chamber elections. Data for these variables was obtained from IFE (www.ife.org.mx).

We also included a series of socio-economic variables that, depending on the candidate, can be considered controls or theoretically important. These variables include the percent share of the municipal population earning one minimum salary or less, the percent share of population over five years of age considered illiterate, the percent share of population over five years of age able to speak an indigenous language, the percent share of population over five years of age observing to the Catholic faith, the percent households with non-earthen flooring, and the percent households with electricity. Data for these variables was obtained from INEGI’s SIMBAD —Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos (www.inegi.org.mx).
Table 1 shows a series of summary statistics for the variables under study here. The municipalities are divided into groups by whether or not they were visited by one of the presidential contenders or not. As shown, those municipalities visited by PAN presidential contender Felipe Calderón obtained on average 45.97% support in the 2003 deputy elections compared to 26.03% for those not visited by the candidate. Similarly, those municipalities visited by the candidate tended to count on, on average, larger voting populations than those that the candidate chose to forego. Those visited by Calderón averaged 10.5 natural logs compared to 7.8 natural logs, that is, about 36,000 voters compared to 2,400 voters. The table also includes summary information on the total votes cast in the 2000 presidential election and on the percent share partisan support. The trends observed in 2003 also occurred in 2000.21

Similar trends obtain for the PRD’s candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador and the PRI’s candidate Roberto Madrazo. Although there is no discernable difference between PRD support in municipalities visited by López Obrador and those where he did not go, this candidate also tended to favor

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21 For reasons of space, we chose not to include statistical analysis of the effect of 2000 turnout and 2000 percent share partisan support but regressions with these variables returned similar results.
municipalities with more votes. Those he visited counted on 9.84 natural logs, or about 19,000 voters, compared to 7.75 natural logs or 2,300 voters. Likewise, PRI candidate Madrazo also chose those municipalities with higher voting populations, though these were not necessarily where the PRI had received most support in the recent past. In fact, the summary statistics comparing PRI support in municipalities where Madrazo went to those where he chose not to go appear to support the reverse conclusion: that Madrazo tended to go where his party was slightly weaker in percent share support.

Of course, no decisive conclusions can be drawn from the summary statistics, as the differences notices in the population sizes of municipalities visited by candidates and those without candidate events do not control for the effect of other variables. However, the statistics raise the possibility that candidates tend to go to the largest cities, and that the PAN was able to target such visits in areas where the party was on average stronger. The PRD and PRI, in contrast, focused on larger cities, without much attention to partisan support in prior elections. This may not seem odd for the PRD, as this party’s poor showing in the 2000 and 2003 federal elections left it without large urban strongholds, with the exception of the Federal District. However, Madrazo’s preference for large cities without regard for partisan support suggests that this party, though having fared well in both the 2000 and 2003 elections, either did not count on large urban strongholds or chose to ignore past trends in partisan support.

| TABLE 2. CANDIDATE VISITS AND STATE GUBERNATORIAL PARTISAN CONTROL (SUMMARY STATISTICS) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **CALDERÓN (PAN)**            | **LOPEZ OBRADOR (PRD)**       | **MADRazo (PRI)**             |
| **VISITED MUNICIPALITY**       | **VISITED MUNICIPALITY**      | **VISITED MUNICIPALITY**      |
| **STATE RULED BY PAN**         | **STATE RULED BY PRD**        | **STATE RULED BY PRI**        |
| **No**                         | **Yes**                       | **No**                        |
| 1865                           | 105                           | 1970                          |
| 1776                           | 179                           | 1955                          |
| 788                            | 43                            | 831                           |
| 431                            | 30                            | 461                           |
| 426                            | 50                            | 476                           |
| 1500                           | 100                           | 1600                          |
| **TOTAL**                      | **TOTAL**                     | **TOTAL**                     |
| 2296                           | 135                           | 2431                          |
| 2202                           | 229                           | 2431                          |
| 2288                           | 143                           | 2431                          |
| **No**                         | **Yes**                       | **No**                        |
| 77.8%                          | 22.2%                         | 78.2%                         |
| 30.0%                          | 70.0%                         | 30.0%                         |
| **TOTAL**                      | **TOTAL**                     | **TOTAL**                     |
| 100%                           | 100%                          | 100%                          |
Table 2 presents another set of summary statistics that includes information on the number of times each candidate visited states controlled by copartisans. At the time of the election, the PAN held 9 out of 32 or 28% total governorships, the PRD 6 or 19%, and the PRI 17 or 53%. Out of 135 total municipal visits by PAN presidential contender Felipe Calderón, 105 (78%) of those occurred in states with PRD or PRI governors and 30 or 22% in PAN-held states. That is, Calderón appears not to have visited states in proportion to their state gubernatorial partisan affiliation. Out of the 229 municipalities visited by PRD candidate López Obrador, 179 (78%) occurred in PAN and PRI states and 50 (22%) in PRD-led states. The PRD candidate thus tended to favor PRD and non-PRD states in proportion to their state partisan affiliation. In contrast, the PRI’s Madrazo visited 143 municipalities, with 100 (70%) occurring in PRI-held states and 43 (30%) in states ruled by the PAN or PRD. Madrazo appears to have favored PRI-led states compared to PAN and PRD ones, well out of proportion to their percent partisan breakdown.

4.2. Statistical Analysis and Discussion of Results
All statistical analyses were conducted using both Logistic Regression and ReLogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression techniques. Given the low numbers of municipal visits by each of the three candidates to Mexico’s large number of municipalities, we were concerned about the possibility biased parameters and problems with statistical tests of significance (King and Zeng, 2001; Tomz, King and Zeng, 2003, 2006). For this reason, we conducted all analysis using both Logistic Regression and Rare Events Logistic Regression and report both sets of results for all models. Interestingly, parameter estimates and significance tests obtained through each method of analysis showed only minimal differences.

These tests found that Calderón visited the largest municipalities, especially those that had voted for the PAN in recent legislative elections. He also visited PRD states, but did not neglect PAN-held municipalities within those states.
Table 3 shows results for tests of Model One about the effect of Mexico’s single, nationwide district on PAN candidate Felipe Calderón’s campaign event strategies. According to this model of candidate strategies, all candidates, including Calderón, should seek to visit the nation’s largest cities and districts in order to make appeals to the largest numbers of voters and thus to maximize support. As shown in Table 3’s Model 1a, Calderón did indeed tend to visit the nation’s largest vote-casting municipalities. The variable capturing the effect of total votes cast in the 2003 deputy elections was positive and significant at the p < 0.001 level. Figure 1 drives home the relationship between municipal voting size and the likelihood of a Calderón campaign event. Cities with low voting populations, that is, below 9 natural logs or 8,100 voters had a 0% chance of receiving Calderón during the campaign. As the size of a municipality’s voting public grew, however, so did the chance of a visit by the PAN presidential contender. As shown in the figure, cities with 11 natural logs or just under 60,000 voters in 2003 casting ballots had a 53% chance of receiving Calderón. Those with 12 natural logs or nearly 163,000 voters had a 64% chance of being visited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3. THE POLITICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DETERMINANTS OF PAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERÓN’S CAMPAIGN EVENT SCHEDULE DURING THE 2006 MEXICAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODEL 1A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENT VOTES CAST FOR THE PAN IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL VOTES CAST IN 2003 (NATURAL LOG)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LESS THAN ONE MINIMUM SALARY EARNERS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 YEARS INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE OVERALL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 YEARS CATHOLIC OVERALL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS ILLITERATE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENT POPULATION WITH NON EARTH FLOORING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCEPT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WALD CHI2(6)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROB &gt; CHI2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PSEUDO R2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOG PSEUDO LIKELIHOOD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ballots cast in 2003 had an 85% chance. Calderón visited the biggest cities in his quest to become president.

Rare events logistic regression results produced similar parameters and significance tests, though they are included here for comparison. All models in Table 1 and all subsequent tables calculate standard errors controlling for state (panel) clusters in order to account for the effect of differing numbers of municipalities per state. State dummy variables could not be used due to problems of multicollinearity with governor dummy variables. To make sure that states like Oaxaca and Veracruz, which count on far more municipalities than most other states, were not biasing results, we reran all regression models using state-by-state elimination. All results remained unchanged, attesting to the robustness of the results and models.

FIGURE 1. THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL VISIT BY PAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERÓN BY TOTAL MUNICIPAL VOTES (X-AXIS) AND AVERAGE LEVELS OF POPULATION EARNING BELOW ONE MINIMUM SALARY (PROBABILITY LINES)

Note: The figure was generated using XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel by Simon Cheng and Scott Long found at http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm. The probability line represents the average percent economically active population earning below one minimum salary in the municipality, which is 20%.

It is important to note that the probability line in Figure 1 holds all other variables at their means. Changes to these variables, particularly variables obtaining significant results, would necessarily lead to changes in the chances of a Calderón campaign event, as will now be shown. Table 3 also tests Model Two about the partisan preferences of candidates. According to this model,
candidates should favor party bastions when organizing and attending campaign events. To test for the presence of such partisan effects, we conducted two regression analyses. The first one, shown in Table 3, Models 2a and 2b, includes a variable capturing the percent share vote received by the PAN in the 2003 deputy elections in each municipality. As shown, this variable is positive and significant at the p < 0.005 level in both the logistic regression and rare events logistic regression results. Interestingly, the variable capturing the size of the overall municipal vote in 2003 also retains its value and significance, despite the addition of this partisan support variable.

**FIGURE 2. THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL VISIT BY PAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERÓN BY TOTAL MUNICIPAL VOTES (X-AXIS) AND PERCENT PAN SUPPORT (PROBABILITY LINES) IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS**

Note: The figure was generated using XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel by Simon Cheng and Scott Long found at http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm. The separate probability lines represent different scenarios for the percent PAN municipal support in the 2003 deputy elections.

Figure 2 presents how partisan support and the size of the municipal voting public work together to affect the chances of a Calderón visit. Though the coefficient for the PAN partisan support variable is much smaller than that for total votes cast, it does have a surprisingly strong effect on the predicted probability of a PAN candidate visit. As shown in the figure, low voting levels have low chances of receiving Calderón, with important changes in the predicted probability of a Calderón visit growing dramatically between 10 and 12 natural logs, that is, in cities with 22,000 to 60,000 citizens casting votes.
However, for cities with 10.33 natural logs, identified with points on the three different lines, could expect different probabilities of a Calderón visit, depending on their prior PAN partisan performance. Cities counting on 10% PAN support in 2003 had an 18% chance of a Calderón visit. In contrast, cities with 40 and 80% PAN support counted on 31 and 52% probability of a Calderón whistle-stop, respectively. As the city voting public grew, so too did the chances of a Calderón visit, with those more PANist municipalities having a much greater chance of PAN campaign events than those with lower proven PAN support.

**TABLE 4. THE POLITICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DETERMINANTS OF PAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERÓN’S CAMPAIGN EVENT SCHEDULE DURING THE 2006 MEXICAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL 1A</th>
<th>MODEL 1B</th>
<th>MODEL 2A</th>
<th>MODEL 2B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOGIT</td>
<td>RARE EVENTS LOGIT</td>
<td>LOGIT</td>
<td>RARE EVENTS LOGIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COEF.</td>
<td>ROBUST SE &gt;</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>COEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD STATE GOVERNOR</td>
<td>1.1712</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI STATE GOVERNOR</td>
<td>0.5177</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT VOTES CAST FOR THE PAN IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
<td>0.0293</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT PAN VOTES * TOTAL VOTES CAST (NATURAL LOG) IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL VOTES CAST IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
<td>1.6750</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>PERCENT POPULATION EARNING LESS THAN ONE MINIMUM SALARY OVER 5 YEARS</td>
<td>0.0528</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIVE POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS:</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS:</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.010</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>0.0219</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS:</td>
<td>-0.1460</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION WITH NON EARTH FLOORING</td>
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<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>90.6100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEUDO R2</td>
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<td>0.4809</td>
<td>0.4809</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS</td>
<td>2404</td>
<td>2404</td>
<td>2404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent Variable is whether PAN presidential candidate Felipe Calderón visited the municipality (yes=1, no=0). All models were estimated using Stata 8’s Logistic Regression (logit) and ReLogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression (relogit) by Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Langche Zeng commands. Missing data resulted in fewer than Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities.

Presidential candidates can also be drawn to municipalities in states with copartisan governors. Table 4 presents a series of models evaluating the
chances of a PAN presidential candidate visit under different state-level government scenarios. The results reinforce casual observation of summary statistics earlier in this chapter: Calderón was more likely to visit PRD-held states than PRI or PAN ones. The coefficient 1.1712 is positive and significant at the p < 0.052 level. Figure 3 demonstrates this tendency, demonstrating the relationship between voting public and the predicted probability of a Calderón visit in PRD states compared to states held by the PRI and PAN. For each point on the lines between 10 and 12 natural logs, that is, between 22,000 and 60,000 votes cast in 2003, the PAN was 23% more likely to visit a PRD-governed state than a PRI- or PAN-governed one.

This finding seems somewhat surprising; however, it is important to keep in mind that Calderón visited the PRD-held Federal District and his home-state Michoacán, which might explain this unusual and unexpected finding. Even so, Calderón maintained his focus on PAN-strong areas within each state, even PRD ones, as shown by the continued positive and significant coefficients for the variable capturing the effect of percent PAN support. This variable was positive and significant at the p < 0.000 level, as was the variable measuring the effect of municipal voting size on the chance of a Calderón visit. Results for the rare events logistic regression were similar to those produced by the logistic regression model.

Now, we turn to analysis of Mexico’s other main presidential contender, Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the PRD and his 229 municipal campaign visits. We find that López Obrador targeted the largest cities in Mexico, but did not make any special effort to visit PRD held municipalities, or those that had voted in a higher rate for him in the last legislative elections. Nor did he tend to visit PRD states at a higher rate than those governed by the PRI or PAN.
FIGURE 3. THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL VISIT BY PAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERÓN BY TOTAL MUNICIPAL VOTES (X-AXIS) AND WHETHER THE STATE IS GOVERNED BY THE PRD (PROBABILITY LINES)

Note: The figure was generated using XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel by Simon Cheng and Scott Long found at http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm. The separate probability lines represent different scenarios for whether the state is governed by the PRD.
Table 5 shows results for the test of Model One about the effect of Mexico’s single nationwide district on the candidates’ tendencies to travel to large cities. As shown in Models 1a and 1b, like Calderón, López Obrador tended to target the nation’s largest towns, at least those having shown the largest votes cast in 2003. This variable, showing a coefficient of 1.2009 in the logistic regression and 1.1998 in the rare events logistic regression, was positive and significant at the p < 0.000 level in both. Figure 4 demonstrates the impact of town size on López Obrador’s event strategy holding all other independent variables in the model at their means. As shown, small voting publics counted on a very little chance of a visit by this candidate, with the predicted probability of a López Obrador campaign whistle-stop beginning to increase dramatically with towns counting on 9 natural logs or 8,100 votes. Municipalities with 22,000 voters in 2003 (10 natural logs) had a 31% chance of a candidate stop. Those with 11 natural logs or 60,000 voters had a 60% chance of a candidate stop. Towns with 163,000 voters (12 natural logs)
had an 83.5% chance of receiving López Obrador. These findings are very similar to those of Calderón.

**FIGURE 4. THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL VISIT BY PRD PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
ANDRÉS MANUEL LÓPEZ OBRADOR BY TOTAL MUNICIPAL VOTES (X-AXIS) AND AVERAGE PERCENT
POPULATION EARNING BELOW ONE MINIMUM SALARY (PROBABILITY LINE)**

Note: The figure was generated using XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel by Simon Cheng and Scott Long found at http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm. The line holds the percent share municipal population earning below one minimum salary at its mean as regression analysis showed no significant effect of this variable on the chance of a PRD candidate municipal visit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODEL 1A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COEF.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN STATE GOVERNOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI STATE GOVERNOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT VOTES CAST FOR THE PRD IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL VOTES CAST (NATURAL LOG) IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL VOTES CAST IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS (NATURAL LOG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION EARNING LESS THAN ONE MINIMUM SALARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS CATHOLIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS ILLITERATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION WITH NON EARTH FLOORING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALD CHI2(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROB &gt; CHI2</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSEUDO R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG PSEUDO LIKELIHOOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent Variable is whether PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador visited the municipality (yes=1, no=0). All models were estimated using Stata 8’s Logistic Regression (logit) and ReLogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression (relogit) by Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Langche Zeng) commands. Missing data resulted in fewer than Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities.

Table 5’s Models 2a and 2b test Model Two about the tendency of candidates to favor party strongholds. In contrast to the results for Calderón above, López Obrador did not favor PRD-strong municipalities. This coefficient was not significant in either the logistic or rare events logistic model. We speculate that in both 2000 and 2003, the PRD had lost some support compared to 1997, with average municipal party support around 16.6% in 2003 and 19.5% in 2000. This left them without obvious party strongholds beyond the Federal District. Indeed, the PRD did not seem to favor states held by PRD governors over other states. The variables capturing whether the state was
run by the PAN or PRI were not significant in Table 6’s Models 1a and 1b, while the variable capturing the level of PRD support remained insignificant. Alternative specifications of the models including a variable capturing whether the state was held by the PRD also returned insignificant results for this variable. Table 6’s analyses using interaction terms in Models 2a and 2b between the level of PRD support and the size of the municipal voting population did not change the results. The interaction term was not significant, while the variable for municipal voting size remained so. López Obrador thus favored large towns and did not spend time in former or current partisan bastions to any greater extent than other municipalities.

Table 7 shows results for tests of Model One and Model Two about the nature of campaigning in a single nationwide district and candidates’ tendencies to be attracted to areas with strong partisan support for the PRI’s presidential candidate Roberto Madrazo. As with his competitors, Madrazo tended to favor larger cities, but did not visit those municipalities in which he had higher electoral support. Instead, he organized events in PRI states.
The variable measuring the effect of municipal voting size on the chances of a Madrazo visit returned a coefficient of 0.7458 that was significant at the p < 0.000 level. Rare events logistic regression produced very similar results, shown by this variable’s 0.7387 coefficient that was significant at the p < 0.000 level.

Figure 5 demonstrates the relationship between municipal voting size and the predicted probability of a Madrazo municipal campaign visit, holding all other variables at their mean values, including that capturing the percent share municipal population earning below one minimum salary which is plotted here. As with the other candidates, small voting publics had little chance of a campaign event in their environs. However, municipalities between the size of 10 natural logs and 14 natural logs saw their chances of a Madrazo campaign stop increase dramatically. It is important to point out here that the slope of this probability function is not as steep as those found for Calderón and López Obrador. Madrazo’s coefficient for the effect of municipal voting population was smaller than those for the other candidates, meaning that though all had a preference for large towns, the largest city

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**FIGURE 5. THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL VISIT BY PRI PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ROBERTO MADRAZO BY TOTAL MUNICIPAL VOTES (X-AXIS) AND AVERAGE MUNICIPAL POPULATION EARNING BELOW ONE MINIMUM SALARY (PROBABILITY LINES)**

Note: The figure was generated using XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel by Simon Cheng and Scott Long found at http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm. The probability line represents the mean municipal population earning below one minimum salary.
centers had a slightly smaller chance of a Madrazo visit compared to his opponents. Calderón and López Obrador, in contrast, made certain to stop at the nation’s largest municipalities, while Madrazo appears to have focused his attentions on large towns but not quite as big as those of Calderón and López Obrador.

Interestingly, though the PRI had previously performed well in both 2003 and 2000 elections, winning on average of 36.8 and 48.3 average percent municipal support, respectively, this party and its presidential candidate did not choose campaign event locations based on municipal support. Table 7’s Models 2a and 2b demonstrate the insignificant effect of the variable measuring the percent PRI support in 2003 deputy elections on the chances of a Madrazo municipal visit. PRI states, however, did receive the PRI presidential candidate at much higher levels than other states.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL 1A</th>
<th>MODEL 1B</th>
<th>MODEL 2A</th>
<th>MODEL 2B</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOGIT</td>
<td>RARE EVENTS LOGIT</td>
<td>LOGIT</td>
<td>RARE EVENTS LOGIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COEF.</td>
<td>ROBUST SE &gt;</td>
<td>COEF.</td>
<td>ROBUST SE &gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN STATE GOVERNOR</td>
<td>-0.4589 0.4401</td>
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<td>-0.4553 0.187 0.015</td>
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<td>PRD STATE GOVERNOR</td>
<td>-0.7458 0.7156</td>
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<td>-0.7512 0.290 0.010</td>
</tr>
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<td>PERCENT VOTES CAST FOR THE PRI IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
<td>0.0062 0.324 0.0061</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL VOTES CAST (NATURAL LOG) IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
<td>0.0099 0.01 0.012 0.0099</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL VOTES CAST IN 2003 DEPUTY ELECTIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPUTY ELECTIONS (NATURAL LOG)</td>
<td>0.371 0.171 0.000 0.7771</td>
<td>0.000 0.171 0.000 0.7685</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION EARNING LESS THAN ONE MINIMUM SALARY</td>
<td>-0.0164 0.321 0.0164</td>
<td>-0.0175 0.016 0.0280 0.0175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE</td>
<td>-0.0017 0.321 0.0164</td>
<td>-0.0175 0.016 0.0280 0.0175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS CATHOLIC</td>
<td>-0.0107 0.240 0.0097</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION OVER 5 YEARS ILLITERATE</td>
<td>-0.0130 0.188 0.0137</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PERCENT POPULATION WITH NON EARTH FLOORING</td>
<td>-0.0085 0.631 0.0079</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-0.0419 0.957 0.0748</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent Variable is whether PRI presidential candidate Roberto Madrazo visited the municipality (yes=1, no=0). All models were estimated using Stata 8’s Logistic Regression (logit) and ReLogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression (relogit) by Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Langche Zeig commands. Missing data resulted in fewer than Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities.
Table 8’s Models 1a and 1b show that both the variables for whether the state was ruled by a PAN or PRI governor were both negative and significant at the $p < 0.015$ and $p < 0.008$ levels, respectively. Madrazo was far more likely to attend campaign events in municipalities lying in states ruled by the PRI, even while controlling for a host of other variables, including municipal voting size which retained its coefficient and significance levels at $p < 0.000$ in both the logit and rare events logit models. This finding about Madrazo’s PRI-state oriented campaign mirrors the summary statistics findings above. Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the clear, differing probabilities of a Madrazo visit if the state is governed by the PRD or PAN.

FIGURE 6. THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL VISIT BY PRI PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ROBERTO MADRAZO BY TOTAL MUNICIPAL VOTES (X-AXIS) AND WHETHER THE STATE IS GOVERNED BY THE PRD (PROBABILITY LINES)

Note: The figure was generated using XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel by Simon Cheng and Scott Long found at http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm. The separate probability lines represent different scenarios for whether the state is governed by the PRD.
FIGURE 7. THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL VISIT BY PRI PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ROBERTO MADRAZO BY TOTAL MUNICIPAL VOTES (X-AXIS) AND WHETHER THE STATE IS GOVERNED BY THE PAN (PROBABILITY LINES)

Note: The figure was generated using XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel by Simon Cheng and Scott Long found at http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm. The probability line represents the mean municipal population earning below one minimum salary.
Conclusions

This paper has helped show that candidate appearances in municipalities continue to make up a large part of the presidential campaign strategy, alongside of the national media appeals. Candidates visit towns, give speeches to the party faithful, speak to local business leaders, consult with religious figures, and hold large-scale rallies. They undertake these activities for several reasons: to reach out to party identifiers and swing voters, to win positive local media coverage, to keep themselves in the national media, and to raise funds. However, each party appears to follow different strategies, most likely because of their differential partisan support. The PAN candidate not only visited the largest municipalities, he made a special effort to go to those that voted PAN in the last elections, while also travelling into PRD governed states in particular. The PRD candidate, on the other hand, cognizant of his spotty local support, concentrated on the largest cities and towns, with less regard for prior voting support. The PRI presidential hopeful also visited the largest municipalities, but was especially careful to visit those in PRI states, in large part to shore up his slipping support among the PRI governors, many of whom did not think he could win, or had not backed his candidacy.
Reference


Domínguez and McCann 1996.


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